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1. INTRODUCTION 
1. AT is getting market appeal. Expert systems, robotics and 5th 
generation technology are  getting serious recognition in the economic 
plans for 1984 and beyond. 
2. The attempt here is to assess the potential impact of A1 future 
technology on commercial organizations and other social institutions. 
3. Technology assessment suffers the lack of a convincing methodol- 
ogy. Hence the strategy here is not to try to predict the actual course of 
A1 innovations, but rather consider what would be the theoretical limits to 
the technology. 
4. Our concern is mainly with AI technology in organizations, i.e., 
with groups of people working in cooperation. These remarks are not 
intended to apply to industrial robots, nor to single user expert systems, 
but rather to what might be called a 'knowledge-based information sys- 
tem' (KBIS). 
5. Such applications would seem to be the eventual result of a con- 
vergence of database management with AI knowledge representation. 
6. To simplify the argument and avoid large literature surveys, we 
take the liberty of imagining a future KBIS as a large scale theorem 
prover operating on a database of logical assertions about the organiza- 
tion and its environment. 
7. This trend might be discerned From the literature on 'logic and 
databases' (Gallaire e t  ai. 1978, 1S81) and the Logic programming discus- 
sions of relational databases (Clocksin and Mellish 1981, Cr~elho 1980, 
Ko~valski 1979b). 
0. The question is, what would/could such a IBIS do? 
9. The principle function of an information system in organizations is 
to facilitate communication between i-nditiduals that are geographically 
and/or temporally separated. 
10. Unlike e.g., telephone or electronic mail, the advantage offered 
by an  information system accessing a s t rmtured database is that it offers 
the possibility of making inferences on the coinmunications it intermedi- 
ates. 
11. Inferencing facilitates the chunking of informat-ion (Miller 1956) 
necessary as communications flow upward in the management herarchy 
(Jacques 1976). 
12. Jay Galbraith (1973, 1.977) observes that hierarchy itself is an 
information processing device, helping the organization to cope with the 
conflicting pulls of a complex environment vs the limited attention and 
bounded rationality of management (Simon 1955). 
13. Knowledge-based information systems would, we expect, reduce 
the complexity by taking over more and more of managerial problem 
solving . 
14. But is there a limit? Wouldn't the future, super-powerful, 
knowledge-based information system eventually eliminate the need for 
management? 
15. The arguments which follow lead to a negative conclusion. Al will 
make an important contribution to management problems, but the brave 
new world of the future will not be built only with technology. 
16. Arguments of t h s  sort tend to rely on the 'unstructuredness' of 
the managerial task as the basis for a view that information technology 
will a t  best aid, but not replace management (Gorry and Scott-Morton 
1971, Keen and Scott-Morton 1978). But that  argument eventually 
encounters a circularity if by 'structured problems' is meant those that  
have a decision algorithm. Technology has an untidy habit of advancing 
beyond problems that were previously thought impossible. 
17. The arguments given here are based on two interconnected 
themes. One is the problem of preferences (goals, values, free will), 
which we argue that computers don't have. (Computers don't intrinsi- 
cally prefer chocolate to vanilla.) The other theme involves basic issues 
in semantics whch,  especially for organizations in dynamic, uncertain 
environments, provide fatal difficulties for even a n  idealized AI system. 
18. The arguments, interestingly, have a certain parallel with issues 
of bureaucracy. Various insights can perhaps be exchanged between A1 
knowledge representation topics and the apparent limitations to bureau- 
cratic rationalization. 
1. A characteristic of machine intelligence is that it is 'rule based.' 
If we consider only this software aspect (and ignore differences in proces- 
sor hardware), then the most ubiquitous and successful examples of 
mechanical cognition are bureaucracies. 
2. Yet while the projects to create various types of artificial intelli- 
gence have a certain romance and intellectual adventwe about them, the 
term 'bureaucracy' seems at best dreary and more often spiteful. It is 
laden with negative connotations plodding, brutish organizations, insensi- 
tive to  the individual; indiffere~t  o the exceptional. 
3. Yet in more scientific usage, 'bureaucracy' is used neutrally as 
merely one form of administration. The negative associations it has in 
popular usage gives empirical evidence that people's encounters with 
bureaucracies are often unpleasant. 
4. The definition of bureaucracy used here is based on Weber 
( 1956/ 19?8), indicating organizations whose administration is based on 
explicit rules and procedures. This contrasts with an idiosyncratic form 
of management based on persons1 interest and the whims of the moment. 
5. Bureaucracies, then, are organizations whose behavior is 'ration- 
alized' to eliminate such idiosyncratic' tendencies. This gives rise to a 
concept of organizat.iona1 r o l e ,  and explicit, detailed job descriptions. 
Personnel become su-bstitutable; the organization takes on a mechanical 
consistency and permanence that outlives its members. In Weber's 
words, 
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is "dehu- 
manized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, 
and emotional elements which escape calculation (Weber 
1956/1978:975). 
6. Consider how this view compares with standard models of compu- 
tation. In automata theory (e.g., Hopcroft and Ullman 1969), we view a 
computer abstractly as a language processor, transforming a n  input 
string of symbols to output symbols (see Figure la) .  In information sys- 
tems applications we can regard these symbols as part of a common 
language, call it LRw, which are assertions about the 'real world' (organi- 
zational environment). These assertions are normally stored in the 
organization's database and the processor is invoked by queries, calls to 
application programs, etc. 
7. Hence, what we call the 'automaton' here is meant to include the 
entire se t  of application programs, DBMS software, query interfaces, etc. 
(in whatever future software designs you like). 
8. The automaton, as language processor, is regarded as a grammar. 
This grammar is itself defined in a notation, call it LC. Practically, LC 
corresponds to an  arbitrary programming language.* 
9. Ignoring efficiency considerations, we might regard LC as reduc- 
ing to a set of production rules (Davis and fing 1975) of the form 
IF <condition> THEN DO <action>. 
* It is common for LISP users and others to deny the distinction between data and program. 
Distinctions however depend on expository purpose. We would of course consider the 
language formed in the union of hW and LC. The two languages are distinguished semantical- 
ly. The semantics of LRw is all those expressions in the information system which denote real 
world phenomena. The semantics of LC -is machine operations. These are of course hopeless 
intertwined in all present day implementations, which is why we resort t o  talking about ideal- 
ized machines. 
If none of the various conditions are met,  that is, if no rule is actuated, 
the default; is inaction. The machine doesn't do anything it 's not 
instructed to dc by one of its rules. 
10. A currently popular view of organizational management (e.g. ,  
March and Simon 1958) regards managers as information processors. 
Taking the metaphor Literally, we might replace the automaton with a 
person (Figure lb) .  
11. The 'programming' of this person might be in another language, 
LB, expressing the various bureaucratic rules and procsdures this person 
is to follow. 
12. But if we regard LB (bureaucratic programming) abstractly in 
the way we did LC (computer pr~gramrning),  we encounter a problem if 
we use only production rules. As observed in a body of literature in 
organizational psychology and sociology (e.g., Maslow 1943, McGregor 
1960, Cyert and March 1963, March and Olsen i979) people are not natur- 
ally idle. They have their own individual interests, goals, aspirations, etc. 
which they are  seeking to satisfy through their participation in the organ- 
ization. 
13. When these correspond to the interests and goals of the organi- 
zation itself, we tend to regard their independent behavior as 'initiative,' 
otherwise it is considered more as the dysfunctional pursuit of 'personal 
interest. '  
14. LB (bureaucratic programming) therefore contains another basic 
aspect. it not only orders the execution of desired behavior, but res-  
t ~ a i n s  the performance of undesired behavior. In Lee (1980), we suggest 
that a primitive structure of bureaucratic software would therefore 
include the basic operators of deontic logic (von Wright 1968), namely, 
(for q an arbitrary action): 
Oq q is obligatory 
Pq q is permitted 
Fq q is forbidden. 
Using negation, these operators are interdefinable. Permission to do q is 
equivalent to not being obligated not to do it (Pq - "ONq), whle forbid- 
ding q is bei.ng obligated not to  do q (F - 0"q). Likewise, permission 
and prohibition (forbiddmg) are negates r~~ - "Pq ; Pq - "Fq). 
15. To be adequate as a language for bureaucratic procedures, these 
operators need to include an  aspect of contingency (corresponding to the 
conditions in production rules). Unfortunately, contingency is not 
straightforward in deontic logic, and a number of proposals appear (Hil- 
pinen 1981a, 1981b). 
16. Note that discretionary actions are those that are not forbidden, 
hence permitted. A 'perfect' bureaucracy, in the sense of being com- 
pletely rationalized and determined, would eliminate permissions 
entirely. Everything would be either (contingently) obligatory or forbid- 
den. 
17. This is of course a macabre and unworkable design for any 
human organization. As Norbert Wiensr (1967) argued i11 the early days of 
computing, such extreme regimentation is an inhuman use of human 
beings; such activities are not orlly economically but ~ o r m a l l y  better left 
to machines. 
3. ORGAh~IZATIONN, ADAPTATION 
1. Jay Galbraith extends the information p r o c e s s i ~  view of organi- 
zations by classifying the environments they face on a two dimensional 
scale of 'complexity' and 'uncertainty' (Figure 2). 
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3. Uncertainty is essentially the amount of surprise or unpredicta- 
bility in the environment. T h s  is different from simple contingencies, 
where the alternatives are foreseen, though the particular outcome is 
unknown. Uncertainty involves completely surprisinp, events. Thus, as 
uncertainty increases, planning, even contingent planning, becomes less 
effective. The organization has to do more and more revision and adapta- 
tion while the task is being performed. 
4. As an analogy, consider planning a road trip. You take along a 
spare tire, extra oil, etc. for the foreseeable contingencies. Then there is 
an earthquake, which you didn't expect and so you have to completely 
reviss your plans. 
5. Rationalization, whether by bureaucratic or computer programs, 
is most effective in situatiocs where complexity is h g h  but uncertainty is 
low. Surprise requires re-programming, and that tends to be time con- 
suming for either type of software. 
6. Left to their own, hcwever, human beings can be quite adaptable. 
So, Galbraith observes, a counter-strategy in highly uncertain environ- 
ments is to rely more on individual discretion, rather than trying to pre- 
program the individual's behavior. This leads to what Burns and Stalker 
(1961) call an 'organic' -as opposed to 'mechanistic' -forms of organiza- 
tion. 
7 .  Ths seems to be effective in uncertain environments where com- 
plexity is low. However, beyond certain fairly modest levels, unaided 
human cognition suffers memory limitations and computational biases 
(Simon 1955, Miller 1956, Tversky and Kahneman 1974). How, then, 
should an organization which faces an environment that is both complex 
and uncertain be administered? 
8. I t  is in response to this question that  A1 research seems most 
promising. 
9. The appeal is that while bureaucratic procedures are generally 
written to be deterministic and inflexible, A1 problem solving research 
has led to approaches where numerous heuristics can be tried for a par- 
ticular problem variant. If one strategy doesn't work, we backtrack and 
look for another. Several strategies may in fact be satisfactory in which 
case we can widen the scope to include less consequential problem vari- 
ables and so provide adaptive, responsive solutions that simple, deter- 
ministic bureaucratic methods don't uncover. 
1. So far we have considered only the character of the instructions 
given to the problem processor, automaton vs human administrator. The 
instructions were expressed in languages LC and LB respectively. 
2. We now consider the language LRw which these entities process. 
Typically the input stream includes s0m.e description of the problem, 
while the output stream is a course of action (to be followed by other 
entities in the organization, whether machine or human or both). 
3. Management texts typically divide the activities of managers into 
planning and control.  In a planning problem the input is current and 
predicted information about the external environment and the output is a 
plan to be followed by subordinate entities (departments, people, 
machines) in the organization. In a control problem the input is current 
and predicted facts about the internal environment as compared to an 
existing plan. The output is a revision to the plan. 
4. T'nis view is quite compatible with the conception cf planning in AI.  
5 .  There are however two differences whch eventually limit the 
degree to which AT technology can take over management takes in the 
organizatioc. We refer to these as the 'ego' and the 'semantic' problems. 
k The Ego Problem 
1. People have preferences, computers don't. Computers (as we 
know them) will never prefer chocolate to vznilla. By preference we mean 
basic or intrinsic values, as opposed to instrumental or intermediate 
goals. Chess programs, for instance, have intermediate goals leading to 
the winning of the game. The goal of winning itself, however, is presumed 
prior to  the system design. 
2. The argument here is not absolute, but rzther political. We could 
for instance imagine a robot with h g h  priority heuristics for survival. 
This might lead down eventually to a sub-goals such as a taste for sweets 
or a compulsion to win at  chess. However, we aren't  likely to allow such 
machines to indulge these preferences if they compete with our own. 
(Note how Asimov's robots (1978) are programmed to be socially inferior.) 
Robot suffrage is not forthcoming. 
3. The converse concept to the social right to have and indulge one's 
preferences is resp~nsibility. The outcome of a computer fraud trial is 
never to  put the computer in jail, 
4. Interestingly, not only people but also organizations are granted 
this social status, A corporation (as well, sovereign state) has indepen- 
dent legal responsibility; it can sign contracts, can be sued, etc. 
5.  The preferences (goals, values) of an  organization are generally 
regarded as deriving from, the preferences of individuals. Capitalist 
economics assumes these to be the values of investors. Socialist econom- 
ics presumes these are imposed by the society a t  large. Theories of 
organization, however, tend to ascribe a larger role to the preferences of 
people within the organization. Cyert and March (1963) note that the 
influence of stockholders in large corporations has come to be minimal, 
and regard the preferences of managers as more significant in a predic- 
tive theory. 
0.  Earlier, bureaucracies were characterized as organizations where 
the influence of individual preferences was minimized. Managers fill 
prescribed roles an are substitutable over time. The organization's life is 
not limited to the life of its members. On the other hand, the mechanis- 
tic character of bureaucracy which gives it permanence, also fixes its 
value structure. Hence railroads, post offices and the military continue 
to pursue ends that no longer coincide with social interests (Boulding 
1978). 
7. In the other extreme, March and Olsen (1979) &scusses the 
nature of organizations where the goals expressed in the organization's 
formal charter are vague and difficult to measure - e.g., universities, 
research institutions, charity organizations, etc. Here the organization's 
goals are heavily inlluenced by those of individual members, and shi€t in a 
fluid way in what they call a 'garbage can process.' 
8.  Deal and Kefinedy (1982) provide an interesting intermediate 
viewpoint in their concept of 'corporate culture' (see also Peters 1980). 
In curnerous case examples, for instance IRM, General Electric, Dupont, 
azld 'Japan, Inc.,' they observe coordinated, cohesive behavior yet without 
heavy bureaucratic regulation. The differentiating variable, they argue, 
is that these orSganizations have built a strong organizational cd tu re  
which Influences and molds individual drives and interests to coincide 
with the organization a t  large. Conversely, individual preferences and 
values also exert influence on those of the organization. The dual 
membership of the individual in the corporate culture as well as the cul- 
ture a t  large ensures that the organization maintains goals and values 
compatible with its larger social context. 
9. The point to be made here is that individual preferences play an 
important role in the adaptation an goodness-of-fit of the organization to 
its social environiient. 
10. While we might conceive of a scenario where a robot or informa- 
tion system also displayed intrinsic preferences, this would be socially 
inadmissible (aod has been in all the science fiction to date). It is of 
course not the preference itself but the tendency to indulge that prefer- 
ence that matters. Having the right to indulge one's preferences (withn 
socially defined bounds) amounts to political participation, a right still 
not won by all human beings, let alone robots. 
11. We observed in the beginning of this section that an important 
function of managers is planning. Planning is also an important A1 topic. 
However, one limitation of AI systems to do organizational planning is in 
the selection of the ultimate preferences and values to which the plans 
are directed. 
12. Another limitation, a semantic one, is discussed next. 
B. The Semantic Problem 
1. We all know that computational semantics is hard. What I want to 
point out here is that, for management applications at  least, its impossi- 
b l e ,  so long as computers don't have a social life. 
2. Semantics is a rather touchy subject, since there are a number of 
definitions that circulate and they are rather hard to separate. Gen- 
erally, semantics is the correspondence between a symbol system 
(language) and its referrents. 
In the first section we distinguished between LC, the language refer- 
ring to the computer and its operation, from LRW, whch referred to the 
organizational environment. In current terminology this might be 
phrased as programming language semantics vs database semantics. 
3. As before, we attempt to avoid the present debates (e.g., various 
data management models vs semantic network representations) by skip- 
ping over aspects of psychological modeling, retrieval efficiency, etc. and 
assume that LRw can be characterized as a (first-order) predicate cal- 
culus language. 
4. The other advantage of this assumption is that it helps to focus 
the immense literature on f ~ r m a l  semantics uriihoilt cornputationai dis- 
tractions. 
5. In the predicate calculus (data management and semantic nets as 
well) we typically make the assumption that semantics follows syntax. 
The is, the semantics of complex expressions is constructible from the 
semantics of its syntactic constituents. (Dorvty et  al. 1981:Ch. 2). This is 
Frege's 'Principle of Compo~itionality. '~ The role of the usual logical con- 
nectives and quantifiers in c o n s t r u c t i ~  the semantics of first order 
assertions is well studied (van Fraassen 1971). What remains is the 
semantics of the open vocabulary of the logic, namely predicate names 
and logical constants. The approaches at this point divide roughly into 
two camps, what we will call the e x t e n s i o n a l  and i n t e n s i o n a l  viewpoints. 
Extensional Semantics 
6. The extensional viewpoint is dominant in formal logic, originating 
mainly from the model theory of Tarski (1956). Here, individual objects 
are regarded as primitive, leaving generic properties and relationships to 
be defined set theoretically. An interpretation or m o d e l ,  <D,F>, of a given 
(first order) predicate logic therefore begins with t.he assumption of a 
domain of individuals, D, and an interpretation function, F, whch maps 
logical constants to individuals in D, l-place predicates to subsets of D, n- 
place predicates to relations on D, etc. 
7. This is entirely satisfactory as long as the population of individu- 
als in D can be clearly specified, and they don't change. 
8. However, a problem for management applications is that organi- 
zations and their environments do  change. Change is fundamental to 
economic growth; it can't be ignored, An obvious step is to extend the 
model to include a time dimension, T, so that  D includes all individuals 
existing at different times. Models of the language are then of the form: 
9. This, however, encounters difficulties when we consider aspects of 
the future. Much of management is concerned with planning. Since 
there may be a variety of alternate or contingent plans, we must llkewise 
consider multiple futures. Ths leads to another extension to the model 
including so-called possible worlds, W, hence adopting models of the form: 
ML = <D, T, W, F> 
10. This is essentially the ontology proposed by Montague (see Dowty 
e t  al. 1981, Lee 1981). While this enables a mathematically elegant solu- 
tion, the question is whether it is still semantics. If semantics is the 
correspondence between symbols and the world, but if the world is not 
* Here we are speaking of formal, constructed languages. The principle of composi.tionality 
doesn't always hold in natural language, e.g., for proper nouns like 'Marilyn Monroe' or nomi- 
nal compounds like 'red herring' where the  referrent of the expression is  not constructable 
from the referents of it 's component words. 
merely the actual world (past and present) but also future and hypotheti- 
cal worlds, we have to consider holv it is we know about these other 
worlds. 
11. Strawson (1959) points out that the principle basis for our 
shareC epistemology is reference withn a common spatial/temporal 
framework. Possible worlds are mental constructions, Gedanken experi- 
ments. They are outside the framework of external reference zind so are 
questionable as a basis for understanding. We return to this prob- 
lem shortly. 
Intensional Semantics 
12. The intensional viewpoint is I think more characteri.stic of the A1 
paradigm (especially semantic net representations). Here, it is not indi- 
vidual objects that are primitive, but rather generic properties and rela- 
tionshps. Particular objects and events are seen as instances of these 
generic concepts. For example, we postulate primitive concepts, M-LE, 
FEMALE, SPOUSE, CHILD and from these are able to define the entire 
vocabulary of kinshp relations. Particldar cases of family trees, etc. are 
regarded as 'instantiations' of these generic concepts. 
13. The intensional approach is entirely satisfactory for what we 
might call idealized or artificial subject domains, where the scope of vari- 
ation is fixed theoretically or by explicit rules. However, the  intensional 
approach also has difficulties, especially in describing real world domains 
where no theoretical foundation is to be found. 
14. For example, suppose we want to develop a concept, LEMON. 
Now we seek to elaborate the essential properties of lemons. This might 
be a property list somethng like: 
COLOR: YELLOW 
SHAPE: OVAL 
TEXTURE: BUMPY 
TASTE: ACID 
The problem, typically, with real world domains is that we can't  simply 
define what a LEMON is, but rather our definition has to  correspond to 
what the users of the system ccnceive lemons to be. Now we run into the 
so-called 'criterial properties' problem. We want a set of properties that 
in conjunction uniquely selects out lemons and only lemons from the  vari- 
ous objects in the environment. The problem here is twofold: that too 
many things qualify (e.g.,  yellow limes) and the definition excludes atypi- 
cal lemons (e.g., green lemons, lemons that aren't  oval, etc.).  Wittgen- 
stein (1953/1958) is a classic elaboration of these difficulties. 
15. There is an interesting relationship between the effectiveness of 
the intensional approach and the status of the science of that  subject 
domain. Chemistry, for instance, provides a criterial definition for water 
(as HzO) Psychology, by contrast, has no criterial definitions for such 
phenomena as intelligence or creativity. 
16. The problem seems all the worse in the social/economic domains 
that are most com.mon to management problems. Consider for instance 
the mundane example of chairs. Is there a single physical characteristic 
that chairs have in common? Consider such examples as rocking chairs, 
stuffed chairs, bean-bag chairs, plastic inflatable chairs. It seems that 
what is common to them all is not what they are, but what we do with 
them, namely sit. But this is nc longer an actual property, but rather a 
propensity or disposition, which leads to similar epistemological difficul- 
ties as with possible worids. (Rescher (1975:Ch.7) comments on disposi- 
tional properties and possible worlds.) 
A Sociological View of Semantics 
- -- 
17. Both the exten.siona1 and intensional approaches to semantics 
suffer epistemological difficulties, especially in the social/economic 
domains typical for management. 
18. This leads to an examination of the mechanisms by which we 
come to know and use the terms of our everyday language. 
19. If we follow the extensional approach, then our main focus will be 
on our knowledge and identification of individuals (people and objects). 
This brings attention to the semantics of proper names and the identifica- 
tion codes we assign to machnes  and other objects. 
20. As Kent (1978) points out, these are of fundamental concern in 
data processing applications, mapping database records to inventory, 
equipment, personnel, customers, suppliers, etc. 
21. How are these names associated to individuals? 
22. In the case of manufactured objects, quite often the identifying 
name is stamped directly on the object. 
23. In the case of names of persons and companies, the identifica- 
tion relies heavily on honest reporting of their names by the entities 
themselves, e.g., on employment applications, sales orders, etc. The 
point is that the organization doesn't have to recognize these individuals 
through some collection of identifying properties, it is simply to ld ,  e.g., "I 
am John Doe," "Here is the XYZ company." 
24. The point applies much more broadly. Most of what we know 
about other individuals (people, places, things) that are temporally or 
geographically distant is what we have been told. The proper name pro- 
vides a tag t o  which various characteristics are attached. The names 
themselves a r e  passed from one person to the next in a series of 'causal 
chains' of reference, leading back to a direct identification of the indivi- 
dual. Sometimes, in th.e case of multiple names for the same individual, 
the causal chains may separate, leading to assertions like 
"Mark Twain = Samuel Clemons" 
having an  informative content rather than being a tautological identity. 
25. Kripke (1971, 1972) applies this concept of causal chains in a for- 
ward fashion in characterizing possible worlds. "Possible worlds are not 
far-away planets," they a.re rather c o n s t r u c t e d ,  based on known, actual 
references. 
26. Consider, for instance: a scenario beginning with the supposition 
that Ronald Reagan is bald. The question arises, how do you know it's 
Ronald Iieagan i f ,  in this possible world, he has different properties. (We 
can exaggerate the case - suppose Ronald Reagan is really a robot, 
manufactured on Mars, etc. - this is called the 'problem of trans-world 
identification of individuals.') 
27. Kripke's point is that we don't have to r e c o g n i z e  Ronald Reagan 
in this world, we s t i p u l a t e  that he is the same in our construction of the 
scenario. The proper name Ronald Reagan is a 'rigid designator.' 
28. Putnam (1970, 1978) suggests a somewhat similar explanation to 
our understanding of generic concepts like 'lemon' and 'chair.' Consider 
the first example of 'lemons.' 
29. Being a. poor cook, my concept of lemons is fairly rudimentary. I 
surely couldn't tell a lemon from a yellow lime. Yet I don't often make 
mistakes in shopping for them. How do I manage? I go to the super- 
market and look for the fruit section. There, typically, is a case labeled 
'lemons,' where I draw my selection. I rely heavily on the supermarket's 
knowledge to know what lemons are. But how does the supermarket 
know? They make purchases orders to a distributor requesting shipment 
of 'lemons.' How does the distributor know? They order 'lemons' from 
certain fruit growers. How do the fruit growers know? Eventually the 
chain goes back to a botanist or agronomist who has certain scientific cri- 
teria for lemons. 
30. Now consider the concept, chair. Again we can follow the chain 
of reference back, this time to certain chair manufacturing companies. 
But how do they know what a chair is? They s p e c i f y  that their products 
are chairs. Thus one enterprising company may stuff burlap bags with 
shredded styrofoam and market it as a 'pillow chair. ' Another might fold 
and paint pieces of cardboard selling them as 'throw-away chairs.' The 
success of their marketing also succeeds in modifying the concept of 
chair. 
31. The effect of these arguments is to introduce a sociological con- 
ception of semantics, what Schwartz (1977) calls the 'new theory of refer- 
ence.' It gives a convincing account of why semantics is so difficult to do 
computationally: semantics isn't fuzzy, it's social. For many of our 
terms, e.g., lemon, chair, the extension of the concept is quite exacting. 
A thing is a lemon (chair) or it is not. However, the cognition that makes 
this discrimination is not an individual one, but rather a cooperation of a 
broad social network. 
32. As Putnam observes, we tend to regard words like hand tools 
that we use individually. For many words, a more fitting metaphor is to 
compare them to a big ocean liner that requires a crew of hundreds for 
its operation. 
5. EXPERT SYSTEMS VS DECISION S P ? S X T  SYST%I.IS 
1. Expert systems are typically built to model individual expertise, 
e.g., a doctor, a travel agent, an  automechanic. The view, generally, is of 
an independently operating problem solver. 
2. Managers don't appear to be experts in this same sense. 
Mintzberg (1973), in an empirical study of the activities of h g h  level exe- 
cutives, notes that a great portion of managerial activity is spent in com- 
munication, observation and clata gathering. LIoreover, soma 70% of their 
time is spent in informal meetings and committees. Indeed, in this sam- 
ple, managers only spent about 22% of their time in isolated concentra- 
tion. The suggesti.on here is that managers, rather than possessing an 
individualized expertise, are more like specialized nodes in a larger 
'organizationcl cognition.' Organizatians in turn, react ixnd participate in 
a larger 'social cognition' in their attempts to market new products 
and/or novel services. 
3. An important part of the manager's activity is to observe and 
understand changes and trends in the market, the economic, legal and 
social environments. Much of this is not simply shifts in magnitude on 
pre-defined dimensional scales. (Were this so, mathematical models 
would surely have a bigger impact on managerial practice.) 
4. Instead, it often involves the modification of primitive concepts. 
For instance, the range of phenomena we call an 'automobile' changes 
from year to year. Each competitive innovation, each new m.ai-keting 
angle, each special interest group expands and re-orzanize s the  
phenomena the manager includes in his/her conceptual framework. And, 
given that  his/her contact with the world is primarily through linguistic 
interactions, the  semantics of organizational language is constantly shift- 
ing. 
5. Because mechanical inference relies on a stable, fixed semantics, 
the utility of an  idealized, fully integrated, knowledge-based inference 
system will be limited to  organizations in completely stable environ- 
ments. Similar criticisms can be made of bureaucratic rationalization 
(Lee 1983). 
6. The conclusion to be drawn is that  integrated information systems 
will only be of use for those aspects of the organization's activities where 
semantic stability can be maintained. This conclusion corresponds to the 
empirical observations made by Gorry and Scott-Morton (1971), which led 
to the conception of 'decision support systems' (e.g., Keen and Scott- 
Morton (1978), Bonczek et al. (1981), Fick and Sprague (198O), Sol (1983). 
7. The underlying idea in the DSS work is to promote the develop- 
ment of technology which, rather than replace human cognition, seeks to 
assist and augment it. The trend seems to  be towards developing DSS 
'generators' which provide computational building blocks which can be 
variously structured for different ad-hoc decision situations. 
8. Interestingly, despite the widely recognized importance of group 
decision making, nearly all DSS packages are oriented towards assisting 
the individual manager in isolation. The explanation may be semantic: 
an individual can assign an  interpretation t o  a particular syntactic 
representation (s)he invents. In a group setting however, the semantics 
is n e g o t i a t e d ,  and our teck~ology so far seerns to have had little effect on 
these socio-linguistic processes. 
1. The preceding arguments can be summarized in the following 
statement: we m a k e  words m e a n  what w e  want. Three aspects are 
emphasized. 
2. We m a k e  words mean what we want. 
Semantics is plastic. As Tarskian model theory so bluntly points out, the 
semantics of a lztnguage is an interpretation assigned to it. Certain truths 
(logical truth) are tautologous in that they hold under any interpretation 
(true in. all possible models). In organizational applications, however, we 
are more concerned with specific interpretations (synthetic truths, true 
in some models, not true in others). The validity of the inferences drawn 
depends on the stability of t h s  interpretation. 
For example, 
is true if in fact all lemons are yellow, but fails if some botanist succeeds 
in generating a strain with different colors and declares that they, too, 
are lemons. 
3. We make words mean what we want. 
Semantic change has a pragmatic component, depending on the 
interests, preferences and values of its users. 
4. We make words mean what w e  want. 
Semantics is plastic, pragmatic, but also the product of social consensus. 
Indeed, it is not only socially determined, but socially understood. 
7. POSTSCRIPT 
The purpose of t h s  paper has been mainly to elaborate a problem 
rather than propose specific solutions. The point certainly has n o t  been 
to discourage further A1 research. Rather, it may serve to explain some 
of the frustration felt in many of attempts a t  knowledge representation, 
particularly in managerial applications. As we suggest here, the problem 
may be overwhelmingly difficult, requiring ultimately a formal explication 
of all of society. If that is the case, we would do well to seek out more 
achievable goals and strategies. 
Likewise, we have to be careful not to overstate our claims. As 
pointed out in the beginning, AI is getting market appeal. Big money is 
shifting. But the people behnd those big decisions aren't technicians nor 
theoreticians. They aren't accustomed to our tendency to extrapolate 
worId shaking implications from toy-sized implementations. They may 
actually believe us. And the plans for 1984 are in the making now. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the stimulating interactions with 
Steven Kimbrough, Eckehart Kohler and Amilcar Sernadas on these 
topics. As well, Werner Shimanovich and other members of the 'Vienna 
Quadrangle' (our humble remake of the Vienna Circle) provided a general 
background of discussion linking artificial intelligence and formal philoso- 
phy. 
REFERENCES 
Asimov, I. 1978. I ,  Robot .  New York: Fawcett. 
Bonczek, R.H., C.W. Holsapple and A.B. Whinston. 1981. F o u n d a t i o n s  of  
& c i s i o n  S u p p o r t  S y s t e m s .  New York: Academic Press. 
Boulding, K.E. 1978. S t a b l e  Peace .  Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Burns, T.,  and G.M. Stalker. 1961. t h e  M a n a g e m e n t  of  I n n o v a t i o n .  Lon- 
don: Tavistock. 
Clocksin, W.F. and C.S. Mellish. 1981. P r o g r a m m i n g  in Prolog.  New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Coelho, H., J.C. Cotta and L.M. Pereira. 1980. H o w  t o  S o l v e  I t  W i t h  Prolog.  
2nd Edition. Lisbon: Laboratdrio Nacional de Engenharia Civil. 
Cyert, R.M. and J.G. March. 1963. A B e h a v i o r a l  T h e o r y  of  t h e  Firm. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Davis, R., and J. King. 1975. An Overview of Production Systems. Stan- 
ford AI Lab Memo AIM-271, Stanford Computer Science Report. 
STAN-CS-75-524. Stanford, California. 
Deal, T.E. and Kennedy A.A. 1982. Corpora te  C u l t u r e s .  Reading, Mas- 
sachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
Dowty, D.R., R.W. Wall, and S. Peters. 1981. I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  M o n t a g u e  
S e m a n t i c s .  Boston: Reidel. 
Fick, G .  and R.H. Sprague, Jr. eds. 1980. Decisbn  Suppor t  S y s t e m s :  
Issues  and  Challenges. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Galbraith, J. 1973. Designing Complex Organizations.  Reading. Mass. : 
Addison-Wesi-ey Publications. 
Galbraith, J. 1977. Organization Design. Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Gallaire, H., and J. Minker. eds. 1978. Logic and Data Bases.  New York 
and London: Plenum Press. 
Gallaire, H . ,  J. Minker and J.M. Nicolas, eds. 1981. Advances in Data Base  
Theory Volume 1. New York and London: Plenum Press. 
Gorry, G.A. and M.S. Scott-Morton. 1971. A Framework for Management 
Information Systems. S l o a n  M a n a g e m ~ n t  Review,  13(1):55-70. 
Hilpinen, R. 1981 a. ed. Deontic Logic: In troductory  a n d  S y s t e m a t i c  
Readings .  Dordrecht: D .  Reidel. 
Hilpinen, R. 1981b. ed. New S t u d i e s  in Deontic Logic. Dordrecht: D .  
Reidel. 
Hopcroft, J.E. and J.d. Ullman. 1969. Formal Languages  a n d  the i r  Rela- 
t i o n  to Au tomata .  Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
Jacques, E. 1976. A General Theory of Bureaucracy .  London: 
Heine mann. 
Keen, P.G.W. and M.S. Scott-Morton. 1978. Decision Suppor t  S y s t e m s .  
Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
Kent, W. 1978. Data a n d  Real i ty .  Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Kowalski, R. 1979a. Algorithm = Logic + Control. Communicat ions  of t h e  
ACM, 22(7): 424-436. 
Kowalski, R. 1979b. Logic for Problem Solv ing.  New York and Oxford: 
North Holland. 
Kripke, S. 1971. Identity and Necessity. In M.K. Munitz, ed. I d e n t i t y  a n d  
Indiuiduat ion. .  pp. 135-164. New York: New York University Press. 
Also reprinted in: S.P. Schwartz, ed. 1977. N a m i n g ,  Necess i ty ,  and  
Natura l  Kinds ,  London: Cornell University Press. 
Kripke, S.A. 1972. Naming and Necessity. In Davidson and Harman, eds., 
S e m a n t i c s  of Na tura l  Language pp.253-355. 
Lee, R.M. 1980. Analyzing Red Tape: The Performative vs Informative 
Roles of Bureaucratic Documents. WP-80-184. Laxenburg, Austria: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 
Lee, R.M. 1981. CANDID Description of Commercial and Financial Con- 
cepts: A Formal Semantics Approach to Knowledge Representation. 
WP-81-162. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis. 
Lee, R.M. 1983. Bureaucracies, Bureaucrats and Information Technology. 
'NP-83-20. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis. 
March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen. 1979. Ambigu i t y  a n d  Cho,ice in Organizations. 
2. Edition. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. 
March, J.G. and H.A. Simon. 1958. Organizaticns.  New York: Wiley. 
Maslow, A.H. 1943. A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review. 
50(4):370-96. 
McGregor, D. 1960. The f l u m a n  S ide  of  Enterprise.  New York: McGraw- 
Hill. 
Miller, G.A. 1956. The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some 
Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information. Psychological 
Review, 63(2):81-97. 
Mintzberg, H. 1973. The Nature  of Managerial Work. New York: Harper 
& Row. 
Peters, T.J. 1980. Management Systems: The Larguage of Organizational 
Character and Competence. Organizational Dynamics .  Summer. 
Putnam, H. 1970. Is Semantics Possible? In: H.E. Keefer and M.K. Mun- 
itz, eds, Language,  Belief ,  and Metaphysics.  New York: State 
University of New York Press. Also reprinted in: S.P. Schwartz, ed, 
Naming ,  Necessi ty,  and  Natural  Kinds,  1977, London: Cornell 
University. 
Putnam, H. 1978. Meaning a n d  the  Moral Sciences.  Boston: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Rescher, N. 1975. A Theory of Possibility. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Schwartz, S.P. ed. 1977. N a m i n g ,  Necessi ty,  a n d  N a t u ~ a L  Kinds, London: 
Cornell University Press. 
Simon, H.A. 1955. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. 7he  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIX. 
Sol, H.G. 1983. Processes a n  Took for  Decision S u p p o ~ t .  Proceedings of 
IFIP/IIASA Working Conference on Processes and Tools for Decision 
Support, July 19-2 1, 1882, Laxenburg, Austria. Amsterdam: North- 
Holland. 
Strawson, P.F. 1959. Indiv iduals .  Garden City, New York: Anchor Books. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. 1974. Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases. Science ,  185(September): 1124-1 131. 
van Fraassen, B.C. 1971. F o r m a l  S e r n n n t i c s  a n d  L.ogic. New York: Mac- 
millan. 
von Wright, G.H. 1960. An Essay in Deontic Logic and the General Theory 
of Action. A c t a  Phi ios3phica  F e n n i c a ,  Fasc. )(XI, Amsterdam: North- 
Holland. 
Weber, M.. 1956/1970. E c o n o m y  a n d  S o c i e t y .  Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, translated from W i r t s c h a f t  u n d  
G e s e l l s c h a f t ,  Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1956. 
Wiener, N. 1967. H u m a n  Use of H u m a n  B ~ i n g s :  ~ Z b ~ r n e t i c s  a n d  S o c i e t y  
New York: Avon Books. 
Wittgenstein, L. 1953/1950. Phi losophica l  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s .  Translated by 
G.E.M. Anscombe. Third Edition. New York: Macmillan. 
